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This paper considers the use of loyalty inducing discounts in vertical 
supply chains. An upstream manufacturer and a competitive fringe 
sell differentiated products to a retailer who has private information 
about the level of stochastic demand. We provide an analysis of the 
market outcomes when the manufacturer uses two-part tariffs (2PT), 
all-unit discounts (AU) and market share discounts (MS). We show 
that retailer’s risk attitude affects manufacturer’s preferences over 
these three pricing schemes. When the retailer is risk-neutral, it 
bears all the risk and all three schemes lead to the same outcome. 
When the retailer is risk-averse, 2PT performs the worst from 
manufacturer’s perspective but it leads to the highest total surplus. 
For a wide range of parameter values (but not for all) the 
manufacturer prefers MS to AU. By limiting retailer’s product 
substitution possibilities MS makes the demand for manufacturer’s 
product more inelastic. This reduces the amount (share of profits) 
the manufacturer needs to leave to the retailer for the latter to 
participate in the scheme.  
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   1 Introduction
A loyalty discount is the practice that implicitly or explicitly makes discounts conditional on
the share of a buyer￿ s purchases made from a supplier within a given period. The discount
is typically applied in a rollback format where once a buyer quali￿es it receives a discount on
all purchases in the period not only on those above the target. This type of discount is in
most cases di¢ cult to link to particular instances of economies of scale. The latter can occur
at overall production level or in ful￿lling a speci￿c order, but they are unlikely to relate to
total purchases of a customer over a period. While loyalty inducing programs directed to ￿nal
consumers have rarely raised competition concerns1, the use of rollback rebates in wholesale
markets has frequently come under antitrust scrutiny in recent years.2
Understanding the motive for the use of these rebates poses a challenge to economics and
policy design. As with related practices of vertical price control and exclusive dealing, ￿rms￿
use of loyalty discounts has the potential to be both procompetitive and anticompetitive. The
major concern with rollback loyalty rebates is that a supplier with substantial market power sets
a low price conditional on exclusive (or nearly exclusive) dealing, with the e⁄ect that a market is
foreclosed to a rival competitor.3 However, a discount that is fundamentally competitive could
be de￿ned as a loyalty discount because it induces the buyer to purchase more from one supplier
and less from another. There are, moreover, several plausible reasons for the use of loyalty
discounts other than exclusion.
In order to assess the impact of such practices on competition and consumer surplus it
is important to disentangle the underlying motivations. This paper studies the private and
social incentives for the use of such contracts under demand uncertainty. In the analysis of
vertical chains the tension between e¢ cient surplus extraction and maximization of surplus
is thoroughly studied as a principal-agent problem where the retailer has private information
related to uncertainty. In contrast to the principle-agent literature where di⁄erent risk attitudes
of the two parties play a central role, previous work in the present context assumes that both
upstream and downstream ￿rms are risk-neutral. It is quite plausible that a manufacturer that
deals with many retailers in di⁄erent local markets (potentially subject to uncorrelated shocks)
behave as risk-neutral. However, it is much less likely that a retailer would agree to bear all
the market risk by signing a contract which aims to induce certain level of purchases at no
additional cost to the manufacturer. In e⁄ect, the current analysis suggests that the di⁄erences
1Probably most familiar to consumers are the ￿frequent ￿ yer￿ schemes promoted by airlines and related
programs run by supermarkets, cafØs, bookstores, or credit card issuers.
2The case law related to loyalty inducing rebate programs is developing faster than the economic analysis of
the practices. Comprehensive overviews of relevant antitrust cases in US and Europe are presented in Mills (2004)
and the OFT report 804 (2005).
3Lately, European and North American case law have focused on whether loyalty discounts can serve as an
exclusionary device that would violate Article 82 of EC Treaty or Section 2 of the Sherman Act. In addition,
￿rms￿use of loyalty discounts in the distribution of their products has also been attacked as unlawful primary
line price discrimination under the Robinson Patman Act and EC law (Art. 82 (c)).
2in attitude towards risk across the vertical levels can explain emergence of di⁄erent types of
loyalty inducing contracts. In particular, it focuses on two-part tari⁄s (2PT) and two types of
rollback discounts with quantity or market share targets. The latter are named all-unit (AU)
and market share (MS) discounts, respectively. We show that under uncertainty, if the retailer
is in￿nitely risk averse, the manufacturer strictly prefers MS and AU to 2PT. Using a linear
demand system, we also show that, for a wide range of parameters, it strictly prefers MS to
AU,4 and welfare is highest under two-part tari⁄s. Private incentives for the use of MS are
driven by their ability to induce the retailer to act on a target share that reduces the demand
elasticity of manufacturer￿ s product. Furthermore, MS limit product substitution while they
allow the retailer to use private information and respond to actual market conditions. Even if
implementation of MS requires costly monitoring of rival sales, there is a non-trivial range of
costs for which the supplier might still strictly prefer them to 2PT or AU. The importance of the
retailer￿ s risk attitude is indicated by the fact that, under risk neutrality, the manufacturer is
indi⁄erent between two-part tari⁄s, rollback market share and quantity discounts. The retailer
bears all risk and purchases the product at marginal cost.
The present article o⁄ers an alternative motivation for o⁄ering certain loyalty discounts
which, in view of regulatory authorities, are implemented due to foreclosure/exclusion reasons.
It assesses the e⁄ects of the various trading forms on competition and welfare.
Despite the ubiquity of this practice, the theoretical literature in economics did not address
rollback loyalty discounts speci￿cally until quite recently. Most of economists￿attention was
captured by related practices like exclusive dealing or incremental units discounts (Bernheim
and Whinston, 1998). Comparisons of di⁄erent rebate schemes, or of alternative contracts
between buyers and suppliers are scarce in the economic literature. Such analysis is important
to understand the conditions that lead to the emergence of a speci￿c type of rebate or trading
form.
Recent research has identi￿ed market conditions under which the use of rollback discounts
improves surplus transfer from retailers to manufacturers.5 Under complete information, Inderst
and Sha⁄er (2010) show that market-share contracts allow a dominant supplier to dampen
competition between the retailers, extract more pro￿t than two-part tari⁄s or own-supplier
contracts, and deliver the joint-pro￿t maximizing outcome. Hence, even absent exclusionary
concerns, market share contracts may harm consumers. Marx and Sha⁄er (2004) propose a
rent-shifting rationale for quantity discounts when two upstream sellers sequentially contract
with one downstream ￿rm. Surplus extraction is better if contracts depend on both seller￿ s
quantities. Exclusion is desirable only if the rival is ine¢ cient.
4This also informs on the relative private desirability of incremental unit discounts (that do not rollback to
inframarginal units once the target is reached) since they cannot improve upon 2PT under our information/risk
setting.
5In a di⁄erent vein, Mills (2004) proposes an e¢ ciency-based rationale. He argues that market-share discounts
may induce merchandising e⁄ort on retailers￿part. Consumers exposed to merchandising are able to make better
purchase decisions. Market foreclosure is unlikely to occur and welfare is increased.
3Under asymmetric information, rollback discounts may solve or alleviate the adverse selection
problem. Kolay, Sha⁄er and Ordover (2004) show that a menu of rollback quantity discounts
generates higher upstream pro￿ts than a menu of two-part tari⁄s in a bilateral monopoly set-
ting, but its welfare e⁄ects depend on demand parameters. Majumdar and Sha⁄er (2009) report
that by conditioning a discount on both quantity and market share thresholds the manufac-
turer can improve upon rollback quantity discounts. The share threshold reduces the retailer￿ s
informational rent by decreasing the attractiveness of concealing a high demand state. The au-
thors identify a condition under which the suggested contracts can replicate the full information
outcome.
This article shows that, under incomplete information, there are private incentives for the
use of loyalty discounts when a risk neutral supplier o⁄ers non-contingent contracts to a risk
averse retailer. Although we address di⁄erent vertical contracts and market structure, our
information setting is similar to Rey and Tirole (1986). They highlight the delegation problem
under uncertainty as an essential driver of private incentives to use vertical restraints and analyze
three types of contracts, two-part tari⁄s (competition), exclusive territories and resale price
maintenance. The interplay of monopoly power exploitation and insurance to secure contracting
underlies the private desirability of the contracts. Private and social incentives may not be
aligned.
Section 2 lays out the model and introduces the contracts under certainty. Section 3 examines
the contracts under uncertainty and retailer risk aversion. Section 4 considers retailer risk
neutrality and discusses a number of extensions. Some concluding remarks are collected in the
last section. All proofs missing from the text are relegated to the appendix.
2 Model
Consider a vertically-related industry where a manufacturer and a competitive fringe operate
at the upstream level. The fringe produces an imperfect substitute of the product supplied by
the manufacturer. The manufacturer and the competitive fringe supply their products in many
independent and identical markets each served by a di⁄erent monopolist retailer.
We are interested in the relative performances of standard non-linear pricing contracts under
uncertainty and risk aversion. We model each retailer as facing an uncertain local demand and
require that the retailer and the manufacturer sign their contract prior to the resolution of the
uncertainty. More precisely the order of moves is as follows. First, the manufacturer o⁄ers a
contract to the retailer. If the retailer rejects, it cannot sell the manufacturer￿ s good. Second, the
demand is determined and the retailer chooses the quantities of the two products to purchase.
Third, the retailer sells the products to the ￿nal consumers at the market clearing prices for
the chosen quantities. The manufacturer is assumed to be risk-neutral, as it operates in many
independent markets with uncorrelated shocks. The retailer is assumed to be risk averse.
4Only non-contingent contracts which avoid arbitrage opportunities across local markets, are
considered. That is, the manufacturer￿ s contract o⁄er is such that at equilibrium the retailer
chooses to purchase at the same wholesale price regardless of the realization of the uncertainty.
If alternatively the manufacturer￿ s o⁄er induced the retailer to buy at di⁄erent wholesale prices
for di⁄erent realizations of uncertainty, retailers that receive di⁄erent demand shocks could
pro￿tably trade with each other.
In each local market, the retailer purchases the goods and resells them to the ￿nal consumers
without incurring additional costs. The retailer buys the competitively supplied product at
marginal cost. Prior to the retailer￿ s ￿nal quantity choices, the retailer and the manufacturer
sign a non-linear contract that stipulates the terms and conditions of purchase. Three types
of contracts are considered: standard two-part tari⁄s, quantity discounts and market share
discounts. All specify a unit price (w) and a non-negative franchise fee (F). Quantity discounts
o⁄er a rebate o⁄-the-list price for all the units purchased once a quantity threshold is met. The
market share contract speci￿es a discount that also applies to all units. However, a share of
retailer￿ s purchases must be made from the manufacturer in order to qualify for the rebate. The
total outlay of a retailer who signs a standard two-part tari⁄ is given by C2PT (q1) = wq1 + F
for q1 ￿ 0: An AU contract stipulates two wholesale prices (wH > wL) and a quantity target





wHq1 + F for q1 < qT
1
wLq1 + F for q1 ￿ qT
1
:





wHq1 + F for q1 < ￿(q1 + q2)
wLq1 + F for q1 ￿ ￿(q1 + q2)
:
The marginal costs of production for both products are assumed to be zero. The inverse
demand system for the di⁄erentiated goods is given by P1(q;￿) and P2(q;￿) , where q = (q1;q2)
is the vector of chosen quantities. Pi(q) 2 C1 and @Pi=@qi < 0 whenever Pi(q) > 0 for i = 1;2.
The parameter ￿ is a discrete random variable which captures potential demand uncertainty
common to both products. It takes with probability p a low value (￿L) and with probability
(1￿p) a high value (￿H). Let E(￿) be the expectation of ￿ and Pi(0;￿L) > 0: Shocks in di⁄erent
downstream markets are assumed to be iid.
The retailer chooses q1 and q2 to maximize its pro￿ts, ￿(q;￿) = R(q;￿) ￿ wq1 ￿ F; where
R(q;￿) = P1(q;￿)q1 + P2(q;￿)q2 is its revenue. We assume that, for a given w; ￿(q) 2 C2 and
is strictly concave and submodular (@2￿=@q1@q2 < 0). The retailer￿ s outside option consists of
selling only the competitively supplied variety. Then, if the retailer rejects the manufacturer￿ s
o⁄er it chooses q2 to maximize R0(q2;￿) = P2(0;q2;￿)q2: Let R￿
0(￿) be the maximal pro￿t of a
retailer which only sells good 2.
5A risk neutral retailer accepts to sign the contract if its expected pro￿t exceeds the expected
value of its outside option. In contrast, an extremely (or in￿nitely) risk averse retailer signs the
contract only if its pro￿ts under the low (worst) demand realization (￿ = ￿L) are higher or equal
than the value of the outside option for that demand scenario.
Under a deterministic demand the objectives of the manufacturer in designing a vertical con-
tract are maximization of the surplus in the vertical chain and extraction of this surplus. Market
power in vertical chains leads to a con￿ ict between maximization and extraction of the surplus
in the chain: surplus maximization might fail due to double marginalization.6 Two-part tari⁄s
are an e¢ cacious way to avoid this problem: The product is passed downstream at upstream
marginal cost and rent extraction is performed through the franchise fee. With deterministic
demand, two-part tari⁄s and discounts based on quantity or market share thresholds de￿ned as
above are all equally e⁄ective tools of replicating the integrated ￿rm￿ s solution.7
Proposition 1 Under deterministic demand, two part tari⁄s, all-unit quantity and market
share discounts are equivalent both from manufacturer￿ s and social planner￿ s viewpoints. They
all maximize surplus in the vertical chain.
3 Uncertainty with a Risk-Averse Retailer
The vertical contracts need to cater for an additional objective if the demand is uncertain
and the retailers are risk averse: insurance provision to the retailers. Achieving this objective
deteriorates the ability of these contracts to eliminate the tension between maximization and
extraction of the surplus. Our principal focus is to understand how the relative performance of
these contracts are a⁄ected by the risk attitude of the retailers. In section 4, we show that the
relative performance of these contracts under uncertainty is still the same when the retailers are
risk neutral.
An in￿nitely risk averse retailer accepts a contract only if under a low demand realization the
contract provides it with pro￿ts weakly greater than its outside option. This requirement implies
that under high demand the manufacturer cannot absorb all surplus via the franchise fee and
any attempt to extract more from the retailer requires a wholesale price above the marginal cost.
Consequently, the unit price charged exceeds the level that maximizes surplus in the vertical
chain. Intuitively, for a given p, a larger di⁄erence ￿H ￿ ￿L makes the retailer￿ s participation
constraint more restrictive and increases the manufacturer￿ s need to absorb surplus via the unit
price. Hence, the fact that a risk averse retailer requires some insurance to sign the contract,
leads to double marginalization even when two-part tari⁄s are used.
Under a standard two part tari⁄, the retailer chooses q1 and q2 to maximize
￿2PT = P1(q;￿)q1 + P2(q;￿)q2 ￿ wq1 ￿ F:
6This intuition goes back to Spengler (1950).
7Table 1 summarizes the equilibrium outcomes under complete information for the linear demand example in
Section 3.
6The optimal output choices, q￿
1(w;￿) and q￿












q2 + P2 = 0: (2)
Let R￿(w;￿) = R(q￿
1;q￿
2;￿) be the optimal second stage revenue. Concavity and submodularity
of the retailer￿ s pro￿ts imply that @q￿
1=@w2PT < 0 and @q￿
2=@w2PT > 0: Under a two-part tari⁄,
double marginalization makes the retailer substitute away from manufacturer￿ s product in favor
of the competitively supplied variety.
The upstream manufacturer sets w2PT and F2PT to maximize
U = pw2PTq￿
1(w2PT;￿L) + (1 ￿ p)w2PTq￿
1(w2PT;￿H) + F2PT
subject to R￿(w2PT;￿L) ￿ w2PTq￿
1(w2PT;￿L) ￿ R￿
o(￿L) ￿ F2PT ￿ 0:
Notice that the outside option (R￿
o) is independent of w2PT and the maximand is increasing in
F2PT; thus the constraint binds at the optimum. By the envelope theorem, (1) and (2) we have

















If a rollback discount does not induce the retailer to act on the threshold, then the retailer￿ s
quantity choices will still be governed by (1) and (2). Consequently, a rollback discount can
improve upon a 2PT only by inducing the retailer to act on the threshold. If a retailer facing an
all-unit quantity discount acts on the threshold then it optimizes by choosing the quantity of the
competitively supplied product to be sold with the threshold quantity for the manufacturer￿ s
product. For example, if the scheme induces to act on the target when demand is low
b q2(qT
1 ;￿L) = max
q2
[R(qT
1 ;q2;￿L) ￿ wLqT
1 ￿ F]
where qT
1 is the quantity threshold that quali￿es for the discounted unit price wL: Let b R(q1;￿)
denote the optimal second stage revenue when the retailer sells q1 units of the manufacturer￿ s
product.
Next proposition establishes that when the retailer is in￿nitely risk-averse there exists an all-
unit quantity discount which the manufacturer strictly prefers to the optimal 2PT. In particular,
the manufacturer can make the retailer buy the same quantity as in the optimal 2PT at a higher
price when the demand is low.
Proposition 2 Under demand uncertainty, with an in￿nitely risk-averse retailer, the upstream
manufacturer strictly prefers all-unit quantity discounts to two-part tari⁄s.














7Consider an all-unit quantity discount which o⁄ers the rebated price b wAU = w￿
2PT if q1 ￿
qT
1 = q￿




1 ) = U2PT: The marginal variation in supplier pro￿ts when increasing wAU
evaluated at b wAU is given by :
@U
@wAU
























Let us now consider rollback market share discounts. Under this type of contract, the retailer
quali￿es for an o⁄-the-list price discount if at least a percentage ￿ of its purchases are made from
the manufacturer. If such a contract induces the retailer to act on the share target, it restricts
retailer￿ s ability to shift away from supplier￿ s product in favor of the competitively supplied
product. This reduces the market for substitutes of manufacturer￿ s product and allows the
retailer to act against a more inelastic demand and charge a higher unit price. A similar e⁄ect
is achieved in the case of a negative demand shock by an all-unit quantity discount. However,
when demand is high, the optimal AU contract does not decrease the elasticity of manufacturer￿ s
product, and then higher wholesale price decreases its sales volume. In addition, even when the
retailer acts on the target, market share contracts allow the retailer to adjust its purchase to
market conditions, unlike quantity discounts. But, MS contracts require costly monitoring of
retailer￿ s purchases, as the threshold depends on rival sales,too.
A retailer which is acting exactly on the share threshold chooses q1 and q2 to maximize
P1(q;￿)q1 + P2(q;￿)q2 ￿ wq1 ￿ F;
subject to q1 = ￿(q1 + q2):
Let s = ￿=(1 ￿ ￿) (note that ￿ 2 (0;1) ) s < 1). Then the constraint requires that q1 = sq2:
Substituting the constraint, it follows that, if the retailer acts exactly on the threshold, the
quantity of good 2, q￿￿
2 ; maximizes:
￿MS = P1(sq2;q2;￿)sq2 + P2(sq2;q2;￿)q2 ￿ wsq2 ￿ F:












q2 + P2 = 0: (5)
Proposition 3 Under demand uncertainty, with an in￿nitely risk-averse retailer, the upstream
manufacturer strictly prefers rollback market share discounts to two-part tari⁄s.
In order to understand the relative private desirability of di⁄erent loyalty inducing schemes
(AU vs. MS) and the social incentives for their use, we focus on a linear demand example which
allows to pin down closed form solutions.
83.1 Linear demand system and welfare analysis
Let the preferences of the representative consumer be given by a quadratic utility:




1 + 2￿q1q2 + q2
2);
where ￿ 2 (0;1) measures product di⁄erentiation. Table 2 summarizes all equilibrium outcomes
when the retailer is risk averse for the linear demand example.




















The retailer￿ s outside option is R￿
o(￿) = (a + ￿)2=4: Hence, the retailer￿ s participation con-
straint in this case requires that ￿￿(￿L) ￿ R￿
o(￿L).
The upstream manufacturer￿ s equilibrium choices and pro￿ts are, respectively:
w2PT = (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ p)(￿H ￿ ￿L), F2PT =




(1 ￿ ￿)[(a + ￿L)2 + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ p)2(￿H ￿ ￿L)2]
4(1 + ￿)
:
The social planner is assumed to be risk neutral and, hence, takes into consideration the
expected welfare and consumer surplus.
Consider a quantity discount. The optimal AU induces only the low type to act on threshold,




￿ (1 ￿ ￿2)(qT
1 )2 + (1 ￿ ￿)(a + ￿L)qT
1 :
The constraint is binding and, at equilibrium,
qT
1 =
(a + ￿L)(1 + p) ￿ (1 ￿ p)(￿H ￿ ￿L)
2(1 + ￿)(1 + p)
; wAU =




(1 ￿ ￿)[a ￿ (￿H ￿ 2￿L)]2
4(1 + ￿)
+
p(1 ￿ ￿)(￿H ￿ ￿L)[a ￿ (￿H ￿ 2￿L)]
2(1 + ￿)(1 + p)
:
As in the case of a two-part tari⁄, risk aversion and the related insurance required by
the retailer to participate in the contract, push up the wholesale price above the level that
maximizes total surplus. However, as shown in Proposition 2, a discount o⁄-the-list price when
total purchases are above qT
1 , allows the upstream manufacturer to absorb more surplus than a
2PT:
UAU =
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 + p)(a + ￿L)2 + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ p)(￿H ￿ ￿L)2
4(1 + ￿)(1 + p)
: (7)
Although the wholesale price involves a higher mark-up than in the case of a 2PT (wAU > w2PT),
when demand is low, the retailer purchases more of manufacturer￿ s product than under a 2PT
due to the incentives provided by the mechanism.
9However, private and social incentives are not aligned: Expected total welfare and expected
consumer surplus are lower under AU than under 2PT,
WAU ￿ W2PT = ￿
(1 ￿ p)(1 ￿ ￿)p2(2 + 3p)(￿H ￿ ￿L)2
8(1 + p)2(1 + ￿)
< 0 and (8)
CSAU ￿ CS2PT = ￿
(1 ￿ ￿)p2(2 ￿ p ￿ p2)(￿H ￿ ￿L)2
8(1 + p)2(1 + ￿)
< 0: (9)
This welfare result is driven by the following quantity changes. In contrast to a 2PT, an
AU makes a retailer who is facing a negative shock to cut down on the competitively supplied
product in order to increase the quantity of the substitute product and qualify for the discount.
Formally, b q2(wAU;￿L)￿q￿
2(w2PT;￿L) = ￿￿(1￿p)p(￿H ￿￿L)=[2(1+p)(1+￿)] < 0: On the other
hand, as the AU discounted wholesale price is higher than the 2PT one, the high type purchases
less of the manufactured product, q￿
1(wAU;￿H) < q￿
1(w2PT;￿H).8
Finally, let us consider a market share contract. A retailer acting exactly on the threshold
chooses optimally only the quantity of the competitively supplied product.9 That is,
q￿￿
2 =
a + ￿ + s(a + ￿ ￿ w)
2(1 + 2￿s + s2)
and ￿￿￿ (w;F;￿) =
[a + ￿ + s(a + ￿ ￿ w)]2
4(1 + 2￿s + s2)
￿ F:
A market share discount could induce the retailer to act on the threshold under both demand
realizations, only under one of them, or under none of them. It turns out that the optimal MS
induces both types to act on the share threshold and choose optimally only the quantity of the
competitively supplied product. The supplier chooses w; s and F to maximize
wMSs
a + E(￿) + s(a + E(￿) ￿ wMS)
2(1 + 2￿s + s2)




The constraint is binding and it follows that, at equilibrium,
sMS = 1; wMS = 2(1 ￿ p)(￿H ￿ ￿L) and
FMS =






As in the case of two-part tari⁄s and all-unit discounts, the participation constraint of the
risk averse retailer leads to a wholesale price above upstream marginal cost. The resulting
upstream pro￿ts are given by:
UMS =
(1 ￿ ￿)(a + ￿L)2 + 2(1 ￿ p)(￿H ￿ ￿L)2
4(1 + ￿)
:
The optimal MS induces retailers to act on threshold regardless of the shock, as it allows for
more ￿ exible downstream choices.
Expected total welfare and expected consumer surplus are lower under MS than under 2PT:
WMS ￿ W2PT = ￿
1
8
(1 ￿ p)(￿H ￿ ￿L)[2(a + ￿L) + 3(1 ￿ p)(￿H ￿ ￿L)] < 0 and
CSMS ￿ CS2PT = ￿
1
8
(1 ￿ p)(￿H ￿ ￿L)[2(a + ￿L) + (1 ￿ p)(￿H ￿ ￿L)] < 0:
8Notice, however, that q
AU
1 (￿) > q
2PT
1 (￿) and q
AU
2 (￿) > q
2PT
2 (￿):
9When acting on the share threshold, the retailer actually chooses optimally the purchases of only one product.
The purchases of the substitute product are determined by the share requirement. We let the retailer choose q2:
10Proposition 4 Under demand uncertainty, with an in￿nitely risk-averse retailer and linear
demand, expected total welfare and consumer surplus are highest under 2PT. Expected consumer
surplus is lowest under MS. For p2 < (1+￿)=2, from both private and social viewpoints, market
share discounts outperform all-unit discounts.
The intuition underlying Proposition 4 is related to the delegation problem in Rey and Tirole
(1986). The manufacturer pursues to fully exploit monopoly power in the vertical chain and
to o⁄er insurance to the retailer under uncertainty. In our model, the fact that the retailer is
a multiproduct ￿rm a⁄ects both upstream objectives. An integrated monopoly optimally uses
market power in the vertical structure. It passes the product downstream at marginal cost and,
under uncertainty, it chooses q1 = q2 = (a + ￿)=[2(1 + ￿)]: The retail quantity responds to the
uncertainty, and the share of manufacturer￿ s product is constant across states. When dealing
with a risk averse retailer, in order to provide insurance, the manufacturer cannot extract the
incremental surplus from the retailer through the franchise fee, and is forced to sell its product









2(1+￿): The quantities respond to the uncertainty. Due to the higher
unit price, the share of manufacturer￿ s product is lower, ￿2PT(￿) = q2PT
1 =(q2PT
1 + q2PT
2 ) < 50%
as the retailer purchases more of the substitute product (in addition, ￿2PT(￿L) < ￿2PT(￿H)).
When demand is low, the AU scheme induces the retailer to act on threshold. This limits







> ￿2PT(￿L)). However, this comes at a cost, as ￿AU(￿H) < ￿2PT(￿H):
Finally, MS allows retailer￿ s choices to respond to the uncertainty, but it prevents the retailer





2(1+￿) : Although, qMS
1 = q2PT
1 ; retailer￿ s demand for q1 is more inelastic when
acting on the threshold and this allows the manufacturer to absorb more surplus by charging a
higher wholesale price. Insurance provision prevents the manufacturer from passing the product
downstream at marginal cost and this causes a loss of e¢ ciency. Nevertheless, a share based
target allows him to restore the vertically integrated share of purchases (￿MS = 50%). Moreover,
the share of manufacturer￿ s product is invariant across demand realizations.
4 Uncertainty with a Risk-Neutral Retailer
The retailer makes quantity choices after observing the realized demand, therefore the second
stage optimization problems presented in the previous section still apply. But, as contracts are
agreed upon before the resolution of uncertainty, a di⁄erent risk attitude changes the ￿rst stage
optimization problem. When the manufacturer faces a risk neutral retailer, the participation
constraint requires retailer￿ s expected pro￿t to be at least equal to retailer￿ s expected outside
option.
11Under a 2PT, the upstream manufacturer chooses w and F to maximize
pwq￿




1(w;￿L)) + (1 ￿ p)(R￿(w;￿H) ￿ wq￿
1(w;￿H)) ￿ F ￿ pR￿
o(￿L) + (1 ￿ p)R￿
o(￿H):
The constraint is increasing in the franchise fee and, then, the supplier chooses the unit price
to maximize pR￿(w;￿L)+(1￿p)R￿(w;￿H): It follows that the optimal unit price wRN satis￿es

























) = 0 (10)
Using (1) and (2), by envelope theorem, (10) becomes pwRN
@q￿
1(￿L)







@w < 0 implies that, at equilibrium,
wRN = 0 and FRN = E￿(R￿(0;￿)) ￿ E￿(R￿
0(￿)): (11)
Let us consider an all-unit quantity discount which induces the retailer to act on the quantity
target only under a low demand. Then, the supplier chooses w; qT
1 and F to maximize
pwqT




1 ;￿L) ￿ wqT
1 ) + (1 ￿ p)(R￿(w;￿H) ￿ wq￿
1(w;￿H)) ￿ F ￿ pR￿
0(￿L) + (1 ￿ p)R￿
0(￿H):
The constraint is increasing in the franchise fee and, then, the supplier chooses w and qT
1 to
maximize pb R(qT
1 ;￿L) + (1 ￿ p)R￿(w;￿H): It follows that the optimal unit price wRN satis￿es










@w ) = 0: By a similar argument as
in the case of a 2PT, it follows that the optimal unit price and franchise fee are given by (11).
In addition, qT
1 = argmaxpb R(qT
1 ;￿L) = q￿
1(0;￿L): The optimal 2PT and AU result in the same
output levels.
Finally, consider a market-share discount which induces the retailer to act on the threshold
always. Then, the supplier chooses w; s and F to maximize
pwsq￿￿
2 (w;s;￿L) + (1 ￿ p)wsq￿￿
2 (w;s;￿H) + F
subject to
p(R￿￿(w;s;￿L) ￿ wsq￿￿
2 (w;s;￿L)) + (1 ￿ p)(R￿￿(w;s;￿H) ￿ wsq￿￿
2 (w;s;￿H)) ￿ F ￿
pR￿
0(￿L) + (1 ￿ p)R￿
0(￿H):
The constraint is increasing in the franchise fee and, then, the supplier chooses w and s to



























) = 0: (12)






@w sw = 0: Then, the
optimal unit price and franchise fee are given by (11).
This analysis proves the following result.
Proposition 5 Under demand uncertainty, with a risk-neutral retailer, the upstream monopolist
is indi⁄erent between two-part tari⁄s, market-share and all-unit discounts. Private and social
incentives are aligned.
The welfare results directly follows from the outcome equivalence. All generate the same
consumer surplus. The retailer￿ s incremental pro￿ts are strictly positive under a positive shock,
but the retailer incurs in losses when demand is low. If the implementation of a market share
contract requires the manufacturer to engage in costly monitoring, this contract should not be
observed in practice. Table 1 summarizes the equilibrium outcomes when the retailer is risk
neutral for the linear demand example.
4.1 Two-part Tari⁄s and Incremental-Unit Discounts
We analyzed two-part tari⁄s, all-unit and market share discounts. Yet there are other type of
contracts that allow to eschew double marginalization in vertical chains. As ￿rst pointed out by
Buchanan (1952), incremental-unit discounts (o⁄-the-list price discounts that apply only to the
additional units purchased above a speci￿ed quantity target) can also be used to transfer rents to
upstream manufacturer. Moreover, Gabor (1955) shows that incremental-unit discounts obtain
the same outcome as two-part tari⁄s under certainty. Kolay, Sha⁄er and Ordover (2004) extend
this result to incomplete information and contingent contracts. We consider non-contingent
contracts and both retailer risk aversion and risk neutrality under uncertainty. In this section
we discuss some relevant equivalence between two-part tari⁄s and incremental-unit discounts
in our setting that allow us to inform on the private and social incentives for their use when
compared to rollback discounts.
Under uncertainty, with non-contingent contracts it can be shown that: i) if the retailer is
in￿nitely risk averse, the pro￿t maximizing two-part tari⁄ is outcome equivalent to the pro￿t
maximizing incremental-unit discount; ii) if the retailer is risk neutral, there exists a two-part
tari⁄ that is weakly better than the pro￿t maximizing incremental-unit discount from manufac-
turer￿ s viewpoint. The converse of ii) does not hold. A risk neutral retailer signs a 2PT whenever
his expected incremental pro￿ts are non-negative. Thus, optimal 2PT tari⁄for the manufacturer
would require the retailer to have expected incremental pro￿ts equal to zero. Then, under a low
demand realization, the retailer￿ s ex-post incremental pro￿ts are negative. No incremental-unit
discount can achieve this outcome since the retailer would choose not to purchase the manufac-
turer￿ s good under low demand realization if he cannot make non-negative incremental pro￿ts
ex-post.
Whenever the retailer is in￿nitely risk averse, the 2PT and the IU are outcome equivalent.
When the retailer is risk neutral, it can be shown that the pro￿t maximizing 2PT is at least
13as good as the pro￿t maximizing IU from manufacturer￿ s viewpoint. Under uncertainty, with
non-contingent contracts, if the retailer is risk neutral (averse), then the upstream manufacturer
weakly (strictly) prefers AU and MS to incremental-unit discounts.
5 Conclusions and Extensions
We have shown that the risk attitude of the retailers can play a crucial role in the form of
contract and loyalty discount applied by the manufacturer. It has been shown that in vertical
relations, manufacturer￿ s preference over the contracts is a⁄ected by their rent extraction and
risk sharing properties. This result carries on to the case of loyalty discount schemes. A novel
driver of our results, in a setting where upstream manufacturer competes with a competitive
fringe, is contract￿ s ability to a⁄ect product substitution.
A market share contract that induces a buyer to act on the share threshold limits retailer￿ s
ability to substitute away manufacturer￿ s product when facing a relatively higher unit price. In
addition, market share contract provides a higher degree of ￿ exibility to the retailer due to the
fact that an absolute share threshold is achievable at many di⁄erent quantity levels. That is, the
retailer can still obtain the discount in a bad season as all of its sales would be low. When the
retailer is risk averse, this allows the manufacturer to guarantee the participation to the contract
at a lower cost than in a 2PT and, for a wide range of parameters, than in an all-unit discount.
However, there is con￿ ict between social and private incentives for the use of the contract, as
total welfare and consumer surplus are highest under 2PT.
When the retailer is risk-neutral the ability to charge a higher wholesale price does not play
a role. The retailer bears all the risk and buys the product at marginal cost. The manufacturer
and the social planner are indi⁄erent between 2PT, AU and MS.
Amongst possible extensions are generalizations in three directions. The two products sold
by the retailer may eventually be vertically di⁄erentiated. It is interesting to see if the results
extend to more general downward sloping demand functions, or to more general utility functions
of the risk averse retailer.
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2PT;￿H) = sH. Then upstream pro￿ts
















i (w2PT;￿L) for s ￿ s￿
q￿￿
i (s;w2PT;￿L) for s > s￿











@s ￿ (1 ￿ p)w2PT
@q￿￿
1
@s : Evaluating this expression
at s￿ where @R
@q1 = w2PT and @R

















































Evaluating (7) at w￿
2PT, given that sq2
@P1
@q1 + (P1 ￿ w) + q2
@P2





























































@q1 ] < 0











@q1 ] < 0 is a necessary condition for a negative semide￿nite Hessian
under a 2PT and @2￿




@q1 ] < 0 under strategic substitutability.
Under the latter assumption,
@q2




2PT: Total surplus (gross utility of the representative consumer) and consumer surplus (utility
net of consumer￿ s expenditure) for ￿ 2 f￿L;￿Hg are given by:
W2PT(￿) =
6a2 ￿ 2a(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ p)(￿H ￿ ￿L) + (1 ￿ p)2(￿H ￿ ￿L)2
8(1 + ￿)
+







2a2 ￿ 2a(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ p)(￿H ￿ ￿L) + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ p)2(￿H ￿ ￿L)2
8(1 + ￿)
+






157 Appendix B: Tables
Table 1 Certainty Case Uncertainty Risk Neutrality
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